Sep 28, 2008
Different Standards At VA And Social Security Raise Questions
Sep 27, 2008
Congress Passes Continuing Resolution
Sep 26, 2008
Election Assistance Commission Writes About Database Shutdown Issue
My Comments On Representation NPRM -- Part III, Confusing Definitions
Entity means any business, firm, or other association, including but not limited to partnerships, corporations, for-profit organizations, and not-for-profit organizations. ...If I understand this correctly, I am simultaneously a principal representative, a professional representative and a representative, while my law firm is simultaneously an entity, a principal representative, a professional representative and a representative! Was someone trying to write this in as confusing a way as possible? How can a corporation be any kind of representative? That takes a flesh and blood human being. What is the point of all these definitions and what is the difference between them? I have read the entire NPRM in the Federal Register and I do not comprehend what was intended. How did something so poorly drafted get through Social Security's vetting process?
Principal representative means an attorney who meets all of the requirements of § 404.1705(a), an individual other than an attorney who meets all of the requirements of § 404.1705(b), or an entity that meets all of the requirements under § 404.1705(b), who has been appointed to represent you in dealings with us and who is responsible for disseminating information and requests from us to you and your other representatives, if any.
Professional representative means any attorney, any individual other than an attorney, or any entity that holds itself out to the public as providing representational services (see § 404.1735) before us, regardless of whether the representative charges or collects a fee for providing the representational services.
Representative means an attorney who meets all of the requirements of § 404.1705(a), an individual other than an attorney who meets all of the requirements of § 404.1705(b), or an entity that meets all of the requirements of § 404.1705(b), whom you appoint to represent you in dealings with us. For purposes of §§ 404.1740 through 404.1799, the term representative also includes an attorney or a non-attorney whom you have not appointed as your representative under the previous sentence but who works for or on behalf of an appointed representative and helps represent you in your claim before us.
And to repeat a concern that I have already written about, why is there no definition given for "representational services", a key term in the NPRM?
You may comment on this proposal online and I encourage you to do so.
SSA Sends Regulatory Proposal To OMB -- Apparent Intent To Cut Back Benefits
SSA Admits Scheduling Hearing Early Due To Pressure
I am happy for Mr. Kirkland, but what about all those other claimants who are not the subject of a television report? When Mr. Kirkland is allowed to jump ahead of them in line, they just get pushed back. That is just not fair.
My crystal ball is cloudy, but this looks like the sort of thing that a Social Security Commissioner would allow only if he were not planning to stay around much longer.
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Sep 25, 2008
Major 9th Circuit Decision On Attorney Fees
We read Gisbrecht not to prohibit a district court from making lodestar-type calculations, but only from relying exclusively on such calculations and refusing to consider the contingent-fee agreement. Here, the district court noted that Gisbrecht controls, and considered the contingent-fee agreements. The district court, however, concluded that substantial reductions in the fees under those agreements were necessary for the fees to meet the statutory standard of reasonableness. Those rulings complied with the requirements of Gisbrecht.Unlike the dissent, we do not read the Supreme Court’s Gisbrecht opinion as mandating any particular procedure or format that the district courts must follow in determining a reasonable attorney fee in social security cases. The Court did not, as the dissent apparently concludes, prescribe that in every case the district court mechanically must begin its analysis with the twenty-five percent contingent fee and then make any reduction in that amount that appears appropriate in the particular case.
As we have noted above, what Gisbrecht held was that “§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” 535 U.S. at 808. The methodology by which a district makes such reasonableness determinations is for that court to select in the exercise of its sound discretion. In making these determinations, it would be preferable for a district court to begin with the contingency-fee agreement and decrease from there, rather than increase from a lodestar calculation. It does not seem to be an abuse of discretion, however, to use the latter approach as long as the court takes the necessary factors into consideration.