Today is the final day in office for Jo Anne Barnhart, who has been Commissioner of Social Security for around five and a half years. Other than Govexec.com, few seem to be noticing this event. The Baltimore Sun has completely ignored her leaving.
Any evaluation of Barnhart's term as Commissioner should start by acknowledging a paradox. Upon becoming Commissioner, Barnhart frankly acknowledged that there were severe problems in Social Security's disability programs, with the biggest problem being how long it was taking to adjudicate cases. She promised to undertake dramatic reforms to make the situation better. Her frank acknowledgment of Social Security's problems and promises for reform have drawn praise from Republicans and Democrats alike. So what is the paradox? The paradox is that the Social Security disability program problems that Barnhart inherited are still there as Barnhart leaves office and they have become worse. Indeed, Social Security as an agency can accurately be described as crumbling, yet Barnhart remains widely admired for her work as Commissioner.
Barnhart promised to make things better, but things got worse. How could she leave office with the aura of having been a successful Commissioner of Social Security? Three reasons come to mind. First, Barnhart has been quite willing to listen to other people. In the Bush Administration this has not been a common virtue. Second, she has not had a nutty right wing agenda. Again, this makes her stand out in the Bush Administration. Third and most important, Barnhart has shown herself to be an excellent politician. She has succeeded in having herself defined by her ambitions rather than by her achievements.
If we are to base an appraisal of Barnhart on her actual achievements, we can only believe her to have been a successful Commissioner if we believe the following three things:
One also has to wonder why Barnhart has only been willing in the last three or four months to blame Social Security's backlogs on an inadequate budget. Why was she almost completely silent on this subject for five years? If Barnhart had been willing to make a fuss about her budget would Social Security have gotten more money? There is no way to know, but Barnhart would be in a stronger position to blame Congress if she had complained publicly that the budgets that Congress was providing were inadequate to provide basic service.
While Congress must bear the blame for what has been appropriated for Social Security, Barnhart's conduct as Commissioner has not helped Social Security's budget situation and has probably hurt. She came into office promising that service at Social Security could be dramatically improved with some improved technology and what amounts to a reorganization. A reasonable Congressperson would have concluded from this that Social Security's service problems were relatively minor and that there was no pressing need for additional funding for Social Security's administrative budget. Had Barnhart concentrated upon Social Security's budget from the beginning rather than distracting Congress by promising a relatively painless fix, Social Security might be in much better shape today. If nothing else, Congress would have a more accurate idea of what the problem is.
Barnhart has also chosen to spend huge sums of money on the implementation of EDIB, the paperless file that she has claimed will make Social Security much more efficient. In the short run the money spend on EDIB has been taken away from current operations. This has hurt the agency. Implementation of any new technology also causes at least short term disruption in operations. That disruption has been quite visible with EDIB and has hurt Social Security in the short run. The question is whether the long term advantages of EDIB outweigh these short term costs. Unfortunately for Barnhart, by this point we have enough implementation of EDIB that we can say that, at best, EDIB, will never yield more than minor productivity gains. Indeed, Barnhart, herself, has been noticeably quiet on the marvels of EDIB over the last year or two -- since about the time the first reports came in on how EDIB was affecting productivity, reports that have yet to see the light of day. This makes, implementation of EDIB look like a very questionable accomplishment for Barnhart.
There are also issues about how EDIB has been implemented. Why was EDIB based upon TIFF files rather than PDF files? TIFF versus PDF sounds arcane, but it is not that complicated. The dominant scanned file technology in the marketplace is Adobe Acrobat, which uses PDF files. TIFF is a technology that has lost out in the marketplace. Other than at Social Security, TIFF is a legacy technology, something that has to be dealt with because there are still files around that were scanned in TIFF years ago, but not something used to scan new files. Commissioner Barnhart chose to hire a contractor who is charging huge sums of money to program TIFF to provide features that are already available off the shelf in Adobe Acrobat. Why lock Social Security into spending huge sums of money to create and maintain a proprietary program that largely replicates a program that is already available in the marketplace? No one ever forced Barnhart to answer this question.
Barnhart has also chosen to turn to large contractors to do most of the scanning for EDIB. This means that Social Security offices receiving material to be scanned generally do not do the scanning in-house. They ship the paperwork to huge scanning centers in other states to be scanned. Is this efficient or reasonable?
Implementation of Barnhart's Disability Service Improvement (DSI) plan has just begun. DSI has not had a chance to either succeed or fail. Will it succeed? The odds seem stacked against it.
The centerpiece of DSI is the Federal Reviewing Officer (FEDRO). At the moment, it is unclear whether Social Security has enough money to hire enough FEDROs to implement DSI even in one small region. Even if the money can be found, it is unclear whether Social Security can find enough people willing to work as FEDROs, when the future of DSI remains uncertain. Even if enough people can be hired, Barnhart has never put forward any compelling rationale for why FEDROs are an improvement over the traditional method of review. Barnhart's main argument seems to have been to ask people to look at how bad things are -- and then say that her plan will be much better, without explaining why. It is undeniable that the current situation is terrible, but that does not mean that any change must be a change for the better. Iraq is a good example of the fact that a poorly thought out plan can always make a bad situation worse.
The other major part of DSI is elimination of the Appeals Council. The pesky problem with this is that everyone who has looked at eliminating the Appeals Council, including Barnhart, knows that simply eliminating the Appeals Council will increase the number of Social Security civil actions in the federal courts to unacceptable levels. Barnhart has promised this will not happen because Social Security will somehow find a way to screen out most of those cases by using some computer program to identify those cases and review them before they ever get to federal court. Yet, no such program exists. Social Security has only recently started seeking a contractor to develop such a program. Actually, there would be a simple way of doing this. That would be to review ALJ decisions denying benefits when the claimant is represented by an attorney who has a history of bringing civil actions against Social Security, but that would not be politically acceptable. It would also be a long term disaster for Social Security since it would just encourage more civil actions. Other than identifying cases to review based upon who is representing the claimant, there is probably nothing that will work. The dramatic increase in business for the federal courts caused by eliminating the Appeals Council is a problem that Barnhart has sought to finesse. Her solution has been to leave the problem for her successor.
Barnhart came into office promising to successfully implement EDIB and DSI so that she could "enjoy" them before the end of her term in office. Clearly, that did not happen. Social Security disability claimants cannot now "enjoy" any of Barnhart's achievements, for there are none. There is scant evidence that future claimants will ever "enjoy" any benefit from Barnhart's plans. At the end of the day, Social Security is demonstrably worse off than when Barnhart arrived and there is little reason to believe that future developments will make her time in office look any better.
In the end, the best defense of Barnhart -- and in the context of the Bush Administration, it may not be a bad defense -- may be that she meant well and we could have done a lot worse.
Any evaluation of Barnhart's term as Commissioner should start by acknowledging a paradox. Upon becoming Commissioner, Barnhart frankly acknowledged that there were severe problems in Social Security's disability programs, with the biggest problem being how long it was taking to adjudicate cases. She promised to undertake dramatic reforms to make the situation better. Her frank acknowledgment of Social Security's problems and promises for reform have drawn praise from Republicans and Democrats alike. So what is the paradox? The paradox is that the Social Security disability program problems that Barnhart inherited are still there as Barnhart leaves office and they have become worse. Indeed, Social Security as an agency can accurately be described as crumbling, yet Barnhart remains widely admired for her work as Commissioner.
Barnhart promised to make things better, but things got worse. How could she leave office with the aura of having been a successful Commissioner of Social Security? Three reasons come to mind. First, Barnhart has been quite willing to listen to other people. In the Bush Administration this has not been a common virtue. Second, she has not had a nutty right wing agenda. Again, this makes her stand out in the Bush Administration. Third and most important, Barnhart has shown herself to be an excellent politician. She has succeeded in having herself defined by her ambitions rather than by her achievements.
If we are to base an appraisal of Barnhart on her actual achievements, we can only believe her to have been a successful Commissioner if we believe the following three things:
- The only reason that there are still big backlogs at Social Security is that Congress would not appropriate the money that Barnhart asked for and that President Bush put in his budget for Social Security.
- EDIB (paperless files) is going to make Social Security significantly more efficient.
- DSI (Disability Service Improvement, Barnhart's reorganization of the Social Security disability process) is going to bring significantly greater efficiency and consistency to disability determination.
One also has to wonder why Barnhart has only been willing in the last three or four months to blame Social Security's backlogs on an inadequate budget. Why was she almost completely silent on this subject for five years? If Barnhart had been willing to make a fuss about her budget would Social Security have gotten more money? There is no way to know, but Barnhart would be in a stronger position to blame Congress if she had complained publicly that the budgets that Congress was providing were inadequate to provide basic service.
While Congress must bear the blame for what has been appropriated for Social Security, Barnhart's conduct as Commissioner has not helped Social Security's budget situation and has probably hurt. She came into office promising that service at Social Security could be dramatically improved with some improved technology and what amounts to a reorganization. A reasonable Congressperson would have concluded from this that Social Security's service problems were relatively minor and that there was no pressing need for additional funding for Social Security's administrative budget. Had Barnhart concentrated upon Social Security's budget from the beginning rather than distracting Congress by promising a relatively painless fix, Social Security might be in much better shape today. If nothing else, Congress would have a more accurate idea of what the problem is.
Barnhart has also chosen to spend huge sums of money on the implementation of EDIB, the paperless file that she has claimed will make Social Security much more efficient. In the short run the money spend on EDIB has been taken away from current operations. This has hurt the agency. Implementation of any new technology also causes at least short term disruption in operations. That disruption has been quite visible with EDIB and has hurt Social Security in the short run. The question is whether the long term advantages of EDIB outweigh these short term costs. Unfortunately for Barnhart, by this point we have enough implementation of EDIB that we can say that, at best, EDIB, will never yield more than minor productivity gains. Indeed, Barnhart, herself, has been noticeably quiet on the marvels of EDIB over the last year or two -- since about the time the first reports came in on how EDIB was affecting productivity, reports that have yet to see the light of day. This makes, implementation of EDIB look like a very questionable accomplishment for Barnhart.
There are also issues about how EDIB has been implemented. Why was EDIB based upon TIFF files rather than PDF files? TIFF versus PDF sounds arcane, but it is not that complicated. The dominant scanned file technology in the marketplace is Adobe Acrobat, which uses PDF files. TIFF is a technology that has lost out in the marketplace. Other than at Social Security, TIFF is a legacy technology, something that has to be dealt with because there are still files around that were scanned in TIFF years ago, but not something used to scan new files. Commissioner Barnhart chose to hire a contractor who is charging huge sums of money to program TIFF to provide features that are already available off the shelf in Adobe Acrobat. Why lock Social Security into spending huge sums of money to create and maintain a proprietary program that largely replicates a program that is already available in the marketplace? No one ever forced Barnhart to answer this question.
Barnhart has also chosen to turn to large contractors to do most of the scanning for EDIB. This means that Social Security offices receiving material to be scanned generally do not do the scanning in-house. They ship the paperwork to huge scanning centers in other states to be scanned. Is this efficient or reasonable?
Implementation of Barnhart's Disability Service Improvement (DSI) plan has just begun. DSI has not had a chance to either succeed or fail. Will it succeed? The odds seem stacked against it.
The centerpiece of DSI is the Federal Reviewing Officer (FEDRO). At the moment, it is unclear whether Social Security has enough money to hire enough FEDROs to implement DSI even in one small region. Even if the money can be found, it is unclear whether Social Security can find enough people willing to work as FEDROs, when the future of DSI remains uncertain. Even if enough people can be hired, Barnhart has never put forward any compelling rationale for why FEDROs are an improvement over the traditional method of review. Barnhart's main argument seems to have been to ask people to look at how bad things are -- and then say that her plan will be much better, without explaining why. It is undeniable that the current situation is terrible, but that does not mean that any change must be a change for the better. Iraq is a good example of the fact that a poorly thought out plan can always make a bad situation worse.
The other major part of DSI is elimination of the Appeals Council. The pesky problem with this is that everyone who has looked at eliminating the Appeals Council, including Barnhart, knows that simply eliminating the Appeals Council will increase the number of Social Security civil actions in the federal courts to unacceptable levels. Barnhart has promised this will not happen because Social Security will somehow find a way to screen out most of those cases by using some computer program to identify those cases and review them before they ever get to federal court. Yet, no such program exists. Social Security has only recently started seeking a contractor to develop such a program. Actually, there would be a simple way of doing this. That would be to review ALJ decisions denying benefits when the claimant is represented by an attorney who has a history of bringing civil actions against Social Security, but that would not be politically acceptable. It would also be a long term disaster for Social Security since it would just encourage more civil actions. Other than identifying cases to review based upon who is representing the claimant, there is probably nothing that will work. The dramatic increase in business for the federal courts caused by eliminating the Appeals Council is a problem that Barnhart has sought to finesse. Her solution has been to leave the problem for her successor.
Barnhart came into office promising to successfully implement EDIB and DSI so that she could "enjoy" them before the end of her term in office. Clearly, that did not happen. Social Security disability claimants cannot now "enjoy" any of Barnhart's achievements, for there are none. There is scant evidence that future claimants will ever "enjoy" any benefit from Barnhart's plans. At the end of the day, Social Security is demonstrably worse off than when Barnhart arrived and there is little reason to believe that future developments will make her time in office look any better.
In the end, the best defense of Barnhart -- and in the context of the Bush Administration, it may not be a bad defense -- may be that she meant well and we could have done a lot worse.
No comments:
Post a Comment