Looking back, there was a significant topic at the confirmation hearing for Mike Astrue to become Commissioner of Social Security that I did not mention in my summary yesterday. That is Astrue's frequent mention of the word "modeling." This is a word that has been seldom mentioned in conversations about Social Security. Of course, Astrue was not referring to anything having to do with fashion. What he was talking about is often referred to as computer modeling or computer simulation. A classic example would be the design of an aircraft wing. The old method of doing this involved creating a mock-up of a proposed wing and putting it in a wind tunnel to see how it would perform. With computer modeling the aircraft wing can be designed on a computer and the computer model of the wing could be tested on the computer without the need for a physical model or a wind tunnel. This is possible because of the development of complex and sophisticated computer programs that allow users to simulate the real world on the computers.
Astrue was talking about "modeling" as a process for producing figures for Congress on what sort of progress Social Security could make in dealing with its backlogs depending upon what level of funding the agency receives from Congress. Perhaps, someone at Social Security has devised a computer program that does "model" their operations. More likely, there is no such computer program, but there is plenty of information about employee productivity that would allow experienced agency personnel to come up with high quality estimates of what could be achieved with various levels of funding. This would be the equivalent of a computer model.
This may sound rather boring, but it is actually an important change of focus. The focus at Social Security over the last dozen years or so has been on "grand plans" which various Commissioners of Social Security promised would yield dramatically improved performance. The first of these grand plans was "Re-engineering" which began in about 1994. Re-engineering got a trial. The trial showed that the plan did not work and "Re-engineering" was abandoned. The second grand plan was "Hearing Process Improvement" or HPI. Trial implementation of HPI began in about 1999. There were early signs that HPI was not working, but in the waning days of the Clinton Administration, Social Security went ahead with full scale implementation of HPI. The result was a disaster, with dramatically worsened performance and vastly increased backlogs. Ignoring the warning signs from "Re-engineering" and HPI, Jo Anne Barnhart, who became Commissioner of Social Security in 2000, launched planning for a third grand plan, which incorporated a technological change -- using paperless scanned files instead of physical files to hold the records concerning a claim for Social Security disability benefits, called EDIB, as well as organizational changes referred to as Disability Service Improvement or DSI. There has been enough implementation of EDIB that it is already clear that it will yield only modest productivity gains at Social Security, at best. DSI is only now starting into implementation -- just as Barnhart leaves her position at Social Security -- so DSI has not had an opportunity to succeed or fail, but there is almost no one who either works at Social Security or who deals with the agency on regular basis who has hope for DSI achieving much.
"Re-engineering", HPI, EDIB and DSI had a huge impact upon Congress' view of Social Security. They created the strong impression that the ever-increasing backlogs at Social Security were the fault of poor organization at Social Security which could be corrected by re-organization, that is that the problems were largely independent of Social Security's budget. It has become increasingly obvious that this approach does not work. Smart people have been trying for decades to re-organize Social Security to get greater productivity and for the most part they have failed. The result of relying upon re-organization instead of budget has been backlogs that can be easily measured and reductions in quality of work produced that are not so easily measured.
In talking about modeling, Astrue appears to be getting away from reliance upon the grand plans that have repeatedly failed Social Security. He is telling Congress that performance at Social Security is tied closely to the agency's operating budget. It is not up to the Commissioner of Social Security to produce a grand plan that magically solves Social Security's problems. It is up to the President and Congress to decide what level of service they are willing to pay for. With modeling, Astrue is going to say, in effect "Here is what you can expect based upon these possible levels for the operating budget you give Social Security. You decide and I'll do the best I can to operate within what you give me. Don't expect me to create a grand plan that pulls a rabbit out of a hat."We can hope that this approach yields a bigger budget for Social Security and better agency performance.
In fairness to Commissioner Barnhart and her predecessors, I should note that the era of grand plans at Social Security corresponds exactly with the era of Republican control of Congress. This may be more than a coincidence. It may be that the grand plans were developed because Republicans in Congress demanded that they be created or because they made it clear that any improvement in service at Social Security could only come from productivity improvement since the agency was not going to get more money, no matter how badly service suffered. Senator Bunning gave an excellent representation of a Republican attitude that may have led to the grand plans, as he vehemently told Astrue that he did not want to hear anything about budget problems at Social Security. He knew that the problem was poor performance at Social Security and he demanded that Astrue do better. Bunning, a Republican, was at one time in the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the House Social Security Subcommittee. Listening to Bunning, it is easy to understand how a Commissioner of Social Security would have felt pressured to come up with a grand plan. Bunning is now in the Senate, his party is no longer in control of Congress and the Ranking Minority Member of the Finance Committee seems to agree that budget is the key to better performance at Social Security, so Bunning's views, while still important, are not controlling.
Astrue was talking about "modeling" as a process for producing figures for Congress on what sort of progress Social Security could make in dealing with its backlogs depending upon what level of funding the agency receives from Congress. Perhaps, someone at Social Security has devised a computer program that does "model" their operations. More likely, there is no such computer program, but there is plenty of information about employee productivity that would allow experienced agency personnel to come up with high quality estimates of what could be achieved with various levels of funding. This would be the equivalent of a computer model.
This may sound rather boring, but it is actually an important change of focus. The focus at Social Security over the last dozen years or so has been on "grand plans" which various Commissioners of Social Security promised would yield dramatically improved performance. The first of these grand plans was "Re-engineering" which began in about 1994. Re-engineering got a trial. The trial showed that the plan did not work and "Re-engineering" was abandoned. The second grand plan was "Hearing Process Improvement" or HPI. Trial implementation of HPI began in about 1999. There were early signs that HPI was not working, but in the waning days of the Clinton Administration, Social Security went ahead with full scale implementation of HPI. The result was a disaster, with dramatically worsened performance and vastly increased backlogs. Ignoring the warning signs from "Re-engineering" and HPI, Jo Anne Barnhart, who became Commissioner of Social Security in 2000, launched planning for a third grand plan, which incorporated a technological change -- using paperless scanned files instead of physical files to hold the records concerning a claim for Social Security disability benefits, called EDIB, as well as organizational changes referred to as Disability Service Improvement or DSI. There has been enough implementation of EDIB that it is already clear that it will yield only modest productivity gains at Social Security, at best. DSI is only now starting into implementation -- just as Barnhart leaves her position at Social Security -- so DSI has not had an opportunity to succeed or fail, but there is almost no one who either works at Social Security or who deals with the agency on regular basis who has hope for DSI achieving much.
"Re-engineering", HPI, EDIB and DSI had a huge impact upon Congress' view of Social Security. They created the strong impression that the ever-increasing backlogs at Social Security were the fault of poor organization at Social Security which could be corrected by re-organization, that is that the problems were largely independent of Social Security's budget. It has become increasingly obvious that this approach does not work. Smart people have been trying for decades to re-organize Social Security to get greater productivity and for the most part they have failed. The result of relying upon re-organization instead of budget has been backlogs that can be easily measured and reductions in quality of work produced that are not so easily measured.
In talking about modeling, Astrue appears to be getting away from reliance upon the grand plans that have repeatedly failed Social Security. He is telling Congress that performance at Social Security is tied closely to the agency's operating budget. It is not up to the Commissioner of Social Security to produce a grand plan that magically solves Social Security's problems. It is up to the President and Congress to decide what level of service they are willing to pay for. With modeling, Astrue is going to say, in effect "Here is what you can expect based upon these possible levels for the operating budget you give Social Security. You decide and I'll do the best I can to operate within what you give me. Don't expect me to create a grand plan that pulls a rabbit out of a hat."We can hope that this approach yields a bigger budget for Social Security and better agency performance.
In fairness to Commissioner Barnhart and her predecessors, I should note that the era of grand plans at Social Security corresponds exactly with the era of Republican control of Congress. This may be more than a coincidence. It may be that the grand plans were developed because Republicans in Congress demanded that they be created or because they made it clear that any improvement in service at Social Security could only come from productivity improvement since the agency was not going to get more money, no matter how badly service suffered. Senator Bunning gave an excellent representation of a Republican attitude that may have led to the grand plans, as he vehemently told Astrue that he did not want to hear anything about budget problems at Social Security. He knew that the problem was poor performance at Social Security and he demanded that Astrue do better. Bunning, a Republican, was at one time in the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the House Social Security Subcommittee. Listening to Bunning, it is easy to understand how a Commissioner of Social Security would have felt pressured to come up with a grand plan. Bunning is now in the Senate, his party is no longer in control of Congress and the Ranking Minority Member of the Finance Committee seems to agree that budget is the key to better performance at Social Security, so Bunning's views, while still important, are not controlling.
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