Odd And Surprising Decision From the Sixth Circuit

Thanks to Eric Schnaufer for posting links to federal appellate decisions in Social Security cases. Here are some excerpts from Cook v. Commissioner of Social Security, issued on March 21, which I would characterize as an odd and surprising decision that suggests that some federal judges look for ways to dispose of Social Security cases without hearing them:

Cook appealed to the SSA’s Appeals Council, which issued a notice of denial of review dated July 27, 2005. This notice was sent to Cook by regular mail in an envelope bearing a postmark of July 28, 2005 ... On Monday, October 3, 2005, Cook filed a complaint in federal district court, appealing the Appeals Council’s denial of review. ...

Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Cook had 60 days from the Appeals Council’s notice of denial in which to file his appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (“When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.”). But he also had a five-day “grace period” before the 60 days began to run, which reflects the SSA’s rebuttable presumption that he received his notice of denial within five days of the date of the notice. 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c). Rule 26(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when the final day of an appeals period falls on a Saturday or a Sunday, then those days are excluded in computing the time period. Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(3). If the appeals period ended on a weekend day, the appellant accordingly would have until the following Monday in which to timely file. ...

But Cook urges us to calculate the five-day period from the date of mailing, represented by the postmark date, rather than from the date on the notice itself. Unlike the facts in McKentry, however, Cook does not deny that he received the Appeals Council’s notice. He instead argues that the district court miscalculated the applicable review period because the notice was not actually postmarked until July 28, 2005, even though the first page of the notice bears a date of July 27, 2005. ...

Contrary to Cook’s argument, this court has consistently calculated the filing period from the date on the notice itself. See, e.g., McKentry, 655 F.2d at 724; Harris, No. 01-3522, 25 F. App’x at 273-74. This is in keeping with the applicable regulations. Cook has presented no persuasive argument for deviating from this interpretation. His complaint filed on Monday, October 3, 2005, was thus one day late.