From Regulating Impartiality In Agency Adjudication by Kent Barnett, 69 Duke L.J.1695-1748 (2020):
... [T]he majorities in Lucia v. SEC and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB expressly declined to resolve whether the U.S. Constitution condones SEC administrative law judges’ and other similarly situated agency adjudicators’ current statutory protection from at-will removal. The crux of the problem is that, on one hand, senior officials may use at-will removal to pressure agency adjudicators [such as Administrative Law Judges] and thereby potentially imperil the impartiality that due process requires. On the other hand, Article II limits Congress’s ability to cocoon executive officers, including potentially agency adjudicators, from at-will removal.
This Article argues that the executive branch itself can and should moot or mitigate this constitutional clash. Nothing in Article II prevents the president from issuing executive orders and agencies from promulgating regulations—collectively, what I refer to as “impartiality regulations”—that require good cause for disciplining and removing agency adjudicators, as well as other means of protecting adjudicator impartiality. Indeed, the executive branch has a long-standing yet overlooked practice of using executive orders and regulations for similar purposes. Impartiality regulations are but one form of the executive branch’s internal separation of powers. Such self-imposed separation provides a strong theoretical and practical solution for the agency-adjudicator dilemma. ...This may be the rare law review article that has an effect on the real world.
By the way, my assumption here is that in Seila Law v. CFPB the Supreme Court will find the position of director of the Consumer Finance Protection Board to be unconstitutional because the incumbent may only be discharged for cause. Perhaps, I should say I expect that the Supreme Court will hold that while the position itself is constitutional, that the incumbent no longer has protection against being discharged without cause. The same would be the case for the position of Commissioner of Social Security. Administrative Law Judges would be next in line and I expect the same for them. I don't think Seila Law is getting as much attention as it should. Lucia was easily dealt with. Seila Law is a much larger threat to federal administrative law. Probably, the only way to deal with it is what the author of this article suggests, that is assuming that one cares about administrative justice. I think that Democrats care about administrative justice. I think that Republicans are enthralled with the idea of "deconstructing the administrative state." I think the only possible result of that is anarchy but judging by the Trump Presidency, Republicans like anarchy.