From Media Matters:Before joining President Donald Trump's administration [as Acting Associate Commissioner at the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Office of Strategic and Digital Communications], right-wing commentator Robert W. Patterson argued against contraceptives because “condom use robs” women of the “remarkable chemicals” in semen; said married women in the workplace have undermined society; and suggested that homosexuality is a mental disorder and sexual orientation can be forcibly changed. ...There's a lot more detail in the Media Matters piece. Patterson is a real nutjob.
Jamie Crouse broke his skull in two places, his collarbone and six ribs, suffered a concussion and lost hearing in one ear in a 2016 motorcycle accident.
The injuries left the chef too dizzy to work anymore in restaurants.
Despite the extensive injuries, it took the federal Social Security Administration more than two years to approve his application for disability.
Crouse is not alone. More than 7,000 people in Syracuse are waiting for hearings to decide if they qualify for Social Security disability benefits. Syracuse’s 19-month wait is among the worst in the nation. After a hearing it can take up to another six months before a decision is issued. That means injured people often struggle to make ends meet or end up homeless as they spend two years awaiting benefits for which they may be entitled. ...
Before Social Security approved his application in November, Crouse was bouncing checks and running up credit card debt.
“I was definitely going under,” he said. “I don’t know if they are understaffed or they just try to bleed you dry." ...
People in Syracuse seeking hearings face some of the longest waits in the nation. The average wait time in November for a hearing was 19 months, the tenth longest in the US.Federal budget cuts are to blame for the long waits. The Social Security Administration’s budget was cut 9 percent between 2010 and 2018. That reduction left the agency short staffed at the same time disability applications were increasing. To fix the problem, Congress increased the Social Security Administration’s funding by $480 million in 2018 to help ease the backlog and approved a $40 million increase for 2019.
But the extra money has yet to shorten the wait for hearings here. ...
If SSA favorably decides my claim(s) and the decision results in past-due (retroactive) benefits, I agree to pay my representative(s) a fee that does not exceed the lesser of 25 percent of my past-due benefits or the maximum dollar amount allowed under the Social Security Act Section 206(a)(2), or such higher amount set by the Commissioner of Social Security based on the date Social Security Administration (SSA) authorizes my representative’s fee.
Choose One:
I agree to pay the maximum fee as stated in the preceding paragraph. ($6000 as of 2018).
I agree to pay less than the maximum $________________ or _____________%.
Read and acknowledge the following: I understand that I, my eligible spouse, any affected auxiliary beneficiary, my representative or the decision maker have the right to protest the fee authorized under this fee agreement, in writing, within 15 days from the authorization.
I understand that my representative may still request a fee even if my case does not result in past-due benefits, or the decision is not favorable. If the fee agreement cannot be approved because there are no past-due benefits or for other reasons, my representative may file a fee petition to request that SSA authorize a fee. I also understand that if there are no past-due benefits withheld, if not enough past-due benefits are withheld, or if my representative is not eligible for direct payment by SSA, I will be responsible to pay the authorized fee to my representative(s) directly. SSA does not authorize out-of-pocket costs and expenses for which I am responsible to pay directly to my representative.
Two-Tiered Fee Agreement
If SSA favorably decides my claim(s) above the ________________ administrative level, this fee agreement is void and my representative(s) may seek a higher fee by filing a fee petition. SSA must authorize this fee.
Escrow/Trust Accounts or Third-party Payments
With my consent my representative(s) has/have or will establish an escrow/trust account in the amount of $__________
My representative will receive a fee from another party (e.g., state, county, private entity) for $__________ and I will have no financial responsibility to pay any fee, unless SSA authorizes the total feeNote that this is written in fluent bureaucratese. Perhaps, because it is a Social Security form our clients will just accept it without giving us trouble but imagine the typical 10th grade dropout understanding it. Well, if you work at Social Security maybe you can't imagine that and maybe that's why this form is written in such stilted language. The form is also flatly inaccurate because it indicates that only the Social Security Administration can authorize a fee in a two-tiered fee agreement situation. No, a federal court can also authorize a fee.
The Social Security Act regulates the fees that attorneys may charge claimants seeking Title II benefits for representation both before the Social Security Administration and in federal court. For representa- tion in administrative proceedings, the Act provides two ways to de- termine fees. If a fee agreement exists, fees are capped at the lesser of 25% of past-due benefits or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000. 42 U. S. C. §406(a)(2)(A). Absent an agreement, the agency may set any “reasonable” fee. §406(a)(1). In either case, the agency is re- quired to withhold up to 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of any fee. §406(a)(4). For representation in court proceedings, fees are capped at 25% of past-due benefits, and the agency has authority to withhold such benefits to pay these fees. §406(b)(1)(A).
Petitioner Culbertson represented Katrina Wood in Social Security disability benefit proceedings before the agency and in District Court. The agency ultimately awarded Wood past-due benefits, withheld 25% of those benefits to pay any attorney’s fees, and awarded Culbertson fees under §406(a) for representation before the agency. Cul- bertson then moved for a separate fee award under §406(b) for the court proceedings, requesting a full 25% of past-due benefits. The District Court granted the request, but only in part, because Culbertson did not subtract the amount he had already received under §406(a) for his agency-level representation. The Eleventh Circuit af- firmed, holding that the 25% limit under §406(b) applies to the total fees awarded under both §§406(a) and (b).
Held: Section 406(b)(1)(A)’s 25% cap applies only to fees for court representation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§406(a) and (b). Pp. 5–9.
(a) Section 406(b) provides that a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” may award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past-due benefits. Here, the adjective “such,” which means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” refers to the only form of representation “already described” in §406(b)—i.e., “represent[ation] before the court.” Thus, the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.
Subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representa- tion and use different methods for calculating fees. Given this statutory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25% cap on court-stage fees to §406(a) agency-stage fees, or the aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees, would make little sense. For example, such a reading would subject §406(a)(1)’s reasonableness limitation to §406(b)’s 25% cap—a limitation not included in the relevant provision of the statute. Had Congress wanted agency-stage fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subsection (a). Pp. 5–7.
(b) The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees does not support an aggregate reading. The statutory text provides for two pools of money for direct payment of fees. See §§406(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). The agency’s choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of past-due benefits does not alter this text. More fundamentally, the amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court. Pp. 7–9.
861 F. 3d 1197, reversed and remanded.
